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Abstract
Energy Harvesting - Wireless Sensor Networks (EH-WSNs) constitute systems of networked sensing nodes that are capable of
extracting energy from the environment and that use the harvested energy to operate in a sustainable state. Sustainability, seen
as design goal, has a signiﬁcant impact on the design of the security protocols for such networks, as the nodes have to adapt and
optimize their behaviour according to the available energy. Traditional key management schemes do not take energy into account,
making them not suitable for EH-WSNs. In this paper we propose a new multipath key reinforcement scheme speciﬁcally designed
for EH-WSNs. The proposed scheme allows each node to take into consideration and adapt to the amount of energy available in
the system. In particular, we present two approaches, one static and one fully dynamic, and we discuss some experimental results.
c© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Program Chairs.
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1. Introduction
Conﬁdentiality and authentication in sensor networks strongly rely upon cryptographic algorithms to encrypt data
and compute cryptographic message authentication codes (CMACs). The encryption algorithms themselves require
a sound design and a strong key to work properly. Assuming that the soundness of communication protocols and
encryption algorithms holds, in this paper we focus on how to securely generate and distribute keys in regular and
energy harvesting (EH) wireless sensor networks (WSNs).
The Importance of Key Management in Sensor Networks. Generally speaking, with the term key management we
identify a series of processes and techniques connected with handling cryptographic keys in a distributed sensor net-
work. Key generation is the ﬁrst step. In order to securely communicate, two entities (node-node or node-sink) require
a so called shared key. These keys should be generated so that only the intended recipients have access to them. Fur-
thermore, depending on the protocol in use, having a single shared key may not be enough. If a security scheme for
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a sensor network (see for instance1) provides both conﬁdentiality and authenticity through a single encryption algo-
rithm, diﬀerent keys should be used for each security service. This can be achieved in diﬀerent ways, by generating
and sharing additional keys, or by deriving sub-keys from a master key. If it is allowed for nodes to dynamically join
and part the network, these procedures should be repeated to accommodate for the new users. Moreover, if forward
and backward security are required, re-keying techniques are needed in order to prevent old nodes to access new
messages and new nodes to decrypt previously recorded packets. In addition to this, cryptographic keys have a ﬁxed
lifespan, they should not be used to encrypt or authenticate more then a given number of messages. This is usually not
a limitation of the key itself, but rather is due to the fact that, depending on the speciﬁc scheme, encrypting the same
values more than once with the same key could potentially leak unwanted information. In order to prevent this and
make each packet unique, additional values are added. However, these values have a ﬁxed length and even by using all
the possible combinations there are only so many of them. When the combinations are exhausted, values will repeat.
To avoid that, keys should be renewed. Last but not least, if attacks are detected or nodes are compromised, new keys
should be distributed once the attack has been dealt with.
Key Management in Energy-Constrained Sensor Networks. While key management is important for the security of
any sensor network, it becomes crucial in energy-constrained sensor networks, such as emerging Energy Harvesting
- Wireless Sensor Networks (EH-WSNs). EH-WSNs constitute systems of networked sensing nodes that are capable
of extracting energy from the environment, such as electromagnetic or piezoelectric energy. Each node is usually
equipped with an energy storage unit that acts as an energy buﬀer. Contrary to traditional WSNs, where the target is
to maximize the lifespan of the networks, the foundational design goal of EH-WSNs is sustainability, based on the
so called Energy Neutral Operation (ENO) state2. The idea is that if the energy that is harvested is more than the
energy that is consumed - over a period of time that can be supported by the energy buﬀers - then the node operates
at a sustainable state and eﬀectively has a continuous lifetime. Sustainability, seen as design goal, has a great impact
on the design of the protocols for the sensor network (including key management protocols) as the nodes have to
adapt and optimize their behaviour according to the available energy. Since traditional key management schemes do
not take energy into account, designing speciﬁc key management schemes able to adapt to the energy constraints and
requirements of each node becomes crucial to secure energy-constrained networks such as EH-WSNs.
Contribution of the Paper. In this paper we propose a new multipath key reinforcement scheme speciﬁcally designed
for EH-WSNs. In our scheme, sustainability can be achieved by balancing the number of reinforcement links used by
the two nodes willing to establish a new key and the availability of reinforcement neighbors. Both parameters can be
adaptively chosen according to the amount of energy available to each node. In particular, we present two diﬀerent
approaches, one static (thresholds for the hysteresis cycle statically deﬁned) and one fully dynamic (sliding threshold
window that adapts to the current harvesting rate of a sensor).
Outline of the Paper. The paper follows an incremental structure. Section 2 introduces canonical approaches for
distributing and managing cryptographic keys in a sensor network. Section 3 focuses on a speciﬁc scheme named
multipath key reinforcement. In particular, we discuss how this scheme can provide better security but why it is not
a good match for EH-WSNs. Section 4 proposes a new version of this scheme speciﬁc for EH-WSNs, taking full
advantage of the diﬀerent energy levels of an EH-WSN by means of an adaptive approach. We conclude the paper by
describing some experimental work (Section 4) and summing up the main contribution of the paper (Section 5).
2. Basic Keying Schemes for Sensor Networks
We will now introduce typical keying schemes for sensor networks and highlight which are their main advantages
and disadvantages for each of them.
2.1. Single Key
The most simple approach that can be adopted is to use a single key for the system. This has numerous advantages
in terms of ease of use. First of all, it is possible to hard-code the key inside a node at the time of creation. In this
way each node has the possibility to interact with every other node of the network without having to carry out any
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procedure. This scheme requires an almost negligible amount of memory since only a single value must be stored.
Furthermore, it is possible for new nodes to join at any time and start communicating with preexisting ones.
Despite these advantages, the single key scheme falls short in terms of security guarantees. First and foremost,
it provides a single point of failure. Whenever a node is compromised so it is the security of the entire system.
With a minimal eﬀort, an attacker is able to eﬀectively become a fully ﬂedged member of the network, able to send
authenticated messages, receive messages addressed to other nodes and decrypt all past and future messages.
As a result, this scheme is usually adopted only for demonstration purposes in security protocols due to its ease of
implementation, but is should never be used in real deployment.
2.2. Pairwise Keys
The opposite approach to the single key is to use a diﬀerent key for each pair of nodes plus the sink. From a
security standpoint this scheme oﬀers the best possible security. If an attacker is able to compromise a node and
obtain all its keys, only the communications which directly involve this node are compromised. Any other message is
secured using a diﬀerent key to which the attacker has no access. Additionally, it is easy to recover from the loss of
a single node, all that is required is to distribute the identity of such node so that every other member of the network
can invalidate the speciﬁc key used to communicate with it.
Unfortunately, this scheme is extremely costly and it does not meet the scalability requirements of a typical WSN.
Given a network with n nodes, the number of necessary keys for the whole system is n(n − 1)/2. Considering that
each node has to maintain a number of keys that increases linearly with the number of nodes (n − 1) and that the
overall number of keys is quadratic in the number of nodes, this translates to a unsustainable memory consumption
for an average node. Assuming a node with 32 KiB of available memory and a cryptographic key of 128 b, the whole
memory would be completely ﬁlled with keys after only 23 nodes. In addition to that, for each node added to the
network new keys must be generated and distributed.
2.3. Random Pre-Distribution
Besides being unsustainable from a memory point of view, the pairwise scheme is also an overkill. Assuming
that we want to achieve link based security, a message is encrypted/authenticated and sent to the next hop where it is
decrypted and checked. The procedure is then repeated for each hop until the ﬁnal destination is reached. This implies
that not every pair of nodes has to share a key, but that one key is needed only for links through where messages are
actually being transmitted. The idea presented in3 takes this into account and proposes a randomized scheme where
a pre-distribution phase assigns a small set of keys to each node in a way that, with high probability, two nodes
connected by a link will share a key. Furthermore, a key generation procedure is used to obtain a key for links that do
not have one.
In the pre-distribution phase a large number of keys P (approximately 217 – 220) is generated. Each node then draws
k values from P and uses them as its key-ring. Trusted controller nodes are then used to store a mapping between the
identity of a node and the identiﬁer of the keys in its key-ring. Finally, each controller node is given the keys shared
with each node.
Subsequently, the shared-key discovery phase takes place. Here each node discovers which key, if any, the node
shares with its neighbours. This is done by having each node broadcast the identity of the keys in the key-ring or
through a challenge-response scheme, depending on whether or not the discovery phase should be public or private.
Each pair of nodes that are physically in range one another and share a common key deﬁne a link.
The third phase, called path-key establishment, allows nodes physically in range but not sharing a key to obtain one.
To do that, pre-existing keys left unused after the shared-key discovery phase are transmitted to the nodes participating
in the path-key establishment.
Once the three phases are terminated, each node in range shares a pair-wise key with its neighbours.
The main property of this random scheme is that the probability that the connectivity graph induced by the network
is connected can be made arbitrarily large. The authors use a formula derived by Erdo˝s and Re´ni4 in the study of
random graphs to show how this can be achieved. Let Pc be the desired probability of the connectivity graph being
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connected and p the probability that there exists a link between two nodes. Then, given a number n of nodes, G(n, p)
is a random graph whose probability of being connected is
Pc = lim
n→∞Pr
[
G(n, p) is connected
]
= ee
−c
(1)
p =
ln (n)
n
+
c
n
where c is any real constant. (2)
This allows to compute the degree of a node as d = p(n−1) which is the required number of neighbors needed by a
node. Furthermore, it is possible to impose connectivity constraints upon the network (required number of neighbors
with a shared key) and the key-ring size, and consequently derive the size of the key pool P given a desired probability
p′ that two nodes share a key. This is obtained from Equation (3)
p′ = 1 −
(
1 − kP
)2(P−k+1/2)
(
1 − 2kP
)(P−2k+1/2) . (3)
We omit the details of how this is derived and redirect the interested reader to the original paper3. Instead we
present a short numeric example to help clarifying the concept.
Assume a network with n = 10, 000 nodes and a desired connectivity probability Pc = 0.99999. By inverting
Equation (1) we obtain c = 11.51 and Equation (2) yields p = 0.002. From this we can compute the required
degree d = 20.71. Hence, if each node has on average d neighbors the network is connected with probability Pc.
Furthermore, if we ﬁx the key-ring size to k = 80 and a probability p′ = 0.5, we can derive the size of the pool from
Equation (3) to be P ≈ 10, 000.
Finally, the increase of the key-ring size is sub-linear in the size of the key pool. For example, if we increase P by
a factor of ten, thus making it P = 100, 000, we have an increase of k of a factor of 3.3 yielding a value of k = 260.
3. Multipath Key Reinforcement for Sensor Networks
The random pre-distribution scheme described in Section 2.3 tackles the problem of distributing shared keys within
a WSN. However, the keys used therein are simply the keys obtained after the shared-key discovery or the path-key
establishment phases. Anyway, all the keys are drawn from a ﬁxed pool and, in order to achieve greater probability
of two nodes to share a key while maintaining the size of the key-ring manageable for the memory size of a node,
the pool should be kept as small as possible. In contrast, with a small pool there is the concrete possibility that the
same key is used on more than one link, therefore if an attacker compromises a node not only all the links that directly
involve the node will be compromised, but also any other link that uses one of the keys found in that node. To address
this, 5 present a multipath reinforcement scheme whose goal is to strengthen the security by allowing each pair of
nodes to use a unique random key. This task can not be solved trivially by generating a sub-key from the already
shared key because an attacker that has been recording the key setup messages prior to capturing a node could now
decrypt those messages and obtain the new key and therefore access all the messages encrypted with it.
The proposed scheme takes advantage of disjoint paths. Assuming that two nodes u and v want to generate a new
key from the existing key kshared, then u chooses j diﬀerent disjoint paths connecting u to v that were setup during
the key distribution phase. For each one of these j paths, u generates a random value x with the same length of the key
and sends it to v through the diﬀerent j paths. After receiving j many values, v computes the new key kreinforced as
kreinforced = kshared ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ x j. (4)
In order to compromise kreinforced, an adversary has to compromise at least one link on all of the j paths. While
increasing the number j of paths decreases the probability of the attacker to succeed, the non immediate trade-oﬀ is
that the longer the path, the higher the probability of an attacker to compromise at least one link. Moreover, computing
the disjoint paths is computationally intensive. To solve this, the scheme uses paths of two hops (three nodes), this
makes the discovery procedure less intensive and ensures that they are disjoint by construction. A quick way to ﬁnd
such paths is for u and v to exchange their neighbors table and identify the nodes in common.
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Assuming ideal communications, i.e., circular communication range with radius r for both transmission and re-
ception, two nodes separated by a given distance have an expected area of overlap of 0.5865πr2. Hence, the expected
number of reinforcing neighbors (the neighbors common to two nodes trying to run the reinforcement scheme) is
given by 0.5865p2n′, where p is the probability of two nodes to share a key and n′ is the number of neighbors of a
node. This can also be expressed in terms of the degree of a node as 0.5865 d2/n′.
We now derive the increase of security achieved by the scheme. Let t be the number of links used to reinforce the
key and qlink the probability that an adversary will compromise a single node. Then the probability that the adversary
will compromise the new key is equal to the probability of compromising either one of the hops in the path, minus the
probability of compromising both. By applying this to all the t neighbors and including the original link we have
qreinforced = qlink(2qlink − q2link)
t. (5)
The protocol average overhead can be approximated to 10, while the eﬀort required by the attacker to break a rein-
forced link for a probability qlink = 0.1 translates to an increase of 146 times. The scheme experiences diminishing
returns, the higher the probability of a node to be compromised, the lower the eﬀort required by the adversary.
4. Adaptive Multipath Key Reinforcement for Energy Harvesting - Wireless Sensor Networks
We now take a closer look at how the multipath reinforcement scheme can be applied to energy-harvesting wireless
sensor networks (EH-WSNs). While the scheme can be run unmodiﬁed in this kind of sensor networks, it will not
take advantage of the core properties of EH. To address that we present a new adaptive scheme that takes into account
the available energy of the reinforcement neighbors.
As we have stressed in Section 1, contrary to WSNs where the target is to maximize the lifespan of the networks,
one of the foundational goals of EH-WSNs is sustainability, reaching the energy neutral operation (ENO) state. In our
scheme this can be achieved by balancing the number of reinforcement links used by the two nodes willing to establish
a new key and the availability of reinforcement neighbors. Both parameters can be adaptively chosen according to the
amount of energy available to each node.
Depending on the particular network and to some extent also on the nature of the energy being harvested, diﬀerent
energy situation are likely to be present. We will now describe how the protocol adapts.
4.1. Scheme Description
Let us assume that nodes u and v want to run the reinforcement scheme in order to obtain a new key. We deﬁne su
as the required number of reinforcing neighbors for node u and ku,v as the maximum number of neighbors connecting
both u and v, that is the size of the intersection of the key-ring of u and v. The value su can be chosen in diﬀerent
ways, for example on a message-per-message basis according to the content of the packet or as a global parameter
depending on the size of the network and the required maximum probability that an adversary will compromise a link.
4.1.1. su > ku,v
If su > ku,v, then there are not enough available neighbors to run the protocol. One option in this case is to wait
for enough nodes to come online. However, given the unpredictability of EH-WSNs this may never realize, and by
the time that new nodes have become available, older ones might have run out of power. In this case if a key must
be established in a short period of time we fall back to a centralized scheme where both u and v are assisted by the
sink node. This protocol in inspired by the well-known Needham-Schroeder protocol6 and by7 where the sink plays
the role of the trusted third party. Each node is equipped with a unique key, shared with the base station (BS). The
protocol will start with u communicating its intention to establish a key with v to the sink node. The sink will generate
a new key eu,v for u and v and a token tu. These values together with the nodes identities are sent to both u and v, each
encrypted with their own BS shared key. After that u will send the token and its own identity to v, encrypting them
with eu,v. The node v will then decrypt this value and compare the identity of u with the one received from the sink. If
the two match, v will encrypt the token under eu,v and send it back to u, thus completing the protocol.
This protocol shifts most of the computational burden towards the BS, however it still requires a signiﬁcant number
of messages to be completed and, most importantly, it is not distributed. Each node relies on the BS and a considerable
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amount of energy will be spent by the nodes close to it since they will be involved in the majority of the traﬃc. For
this reason this protocol is suitable only when not enough neighbors are available.
4.1.2. su ≤ ku,v
In case su ≤ ku,v, then the protocol can be run if the reinforcing neighbors have enough energy available to partici-
pate. This value can be advertised by the nodes themselves. An ideal way to do that is by including this information
together with the amount of energy available to the node as part of the MAC1 protocol, such as in a beacon of a
receiver-initiated (RI) MAC protocol8. In this way, u will receive regular updates with a minimal overhead. When
enough neighbors are available u can greedily choose the du ones with the highest amount of energy and start the
protocol with them.
A node will choose autonomously whether or not it is able to participate to a run of the protocol and advertise that
to its neighborhood. One way to achieve that is by setting a threshold on the energy reservoir above which a node is
considered to have stored enough energy to participate. The disadvantage of this approach is that if a node is hovering
around the threshold value it might be asked to take place in a run only to ﬁnd itself without enough energy when the
actual ensuing transmission should be performed. To avoid that we deﬁne a threshold window (tlow, thigh) eﬀectively
setting up a comparator with hysteresis. Whenever the energy available to a node is less than tlow the node will not
participate in the protocol, whereas if the value is above thigh the node will consider itself able to participate. If the
current available energy falls within the range (tlow, thigh) the node will maintain its previous status until one of the
other conditions is met. This provides a conﬁgurable energy buﬀer that can be varied according to many parameters
such as the typical load of the node, the size of the energy reservoir, the length of a packet, etc.
The (tlow, thigh) window can be controlled by varying three parameters. The value of thigh will determine how
quickly the node will start participating, that is the amount of energy required in order to be considered eligible for the
protocol. The value of tlow will determine how aggressively the node will participate or how quickly it will transition
from the eligible to the ineligible state. The diﬀerence thigh−tlow will determine the size of the buﬀer or how resilient
the node is to change its status after a change in its available energy.
4.2. Scheme Evaluation
In order to evaluate diﬀerent approaches we ran a series of simulations. For this purpose we built a custom tool
using the Java programming language. The tool uses the common technique of generating discrete events that are
consumed based on a priority function that represents the time elapsed. Each node is assigned a random harvesting
rate, the value is sampled from a normal distribution with a mean of 0.015 and a standard deviation of 0.005. To
extract pseudo-random samples, the default LCM generation built into Java has been used. The diﬀerent simulations
have been run for a period of 180,000 time-units.
Three arrangements of thresholds have been used, in each of them the threshold is expressed as a portion of a
unity energy reservoir. The ﬁrst arrangement is t1 = (0.8, 0.9), the window is small in size and located towards the
maximum value. This produces a very conservative behavior where in order to become eligible, a node has to be
almost fully charged. The second arrangement is t2 = (0.1, 0.2) in which the window has the same size but its position
is signiﬁcantly lower. In this case a small amount of energy is required for the node to participate in the scheme and
it will keep participating until its reservoir is almost completely depleted. The third arrangement is t3 = (0.15, 0.85)
where the two threshold are set at the midway point of the previous arrangements, thus making the window size
considerably wider. As a result, this will provide a more stable behavior where the node will maintain its status for
longer and transition from one mode to the other when is either considerably charged or almost out of power.
We evaluated these thresholds in three diﬀerent network scenarios, by varying s and k of (2, 3), (2, 4) and (3, 4),
respectively. The simulation continuously runs the reinforcement scheme as the only main task within a node. We let
the simulation run for an allotted amount of time while randomly changing the amount of energy harvested by each
reinforcing neighbor and keeping track of how many times the protocol was successfully run.
1 Medium Access Control
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Fig. 1: Multipath reinforcement for EH-WSNs. Here the thresholds for the hysteresis cycle are statically deﬁned.
As shown in Figure 1, the common trend is that the second conﬁguration, which was the most permissive one,
always achieves the highest number of runs, whereas conﬁguration number one, being the most conservative, achieves
the lowest amount of protocol executions. Finally, the third conﬁguration presents a good compromise on the number
of runs by keeping the node active most of the time while not letting it run as low in power as the ﬁrst scheme. This
was indeed the expected behavior.
The three conﬁgurations are a good display of how diﬀerent parameters can be accommodated by the system.
Depending on what is the desired energy status of the nodes, the thresholds can be set accordingly. If the network
prioritizes security and therefore wants the scheme to be able to run whenever is required, without worrying of the
fact that this could cause some of the nodes involved in the protocol to consume all of their stored energy, then a
conﬁguration similar to the ﬁrst arrangement can be used. On the other hand, if we need a network where energy
should be mainly used to exchange messages and perform other tasks, while the key reinforcement should be run
only when there is some disposable energy, then the second conﬁguration is the most suited. The third conﬁguration
is a high resiliency one and can be used for example when there are relatively short and frequent ﬂuctuation in the
availability of the scavenged energy source.
If the main energy source were to disappear for a long enough period of time, the ﬁrst conﬁguration would prevent
a node to partake in the protocol almost immediately (as soon as the stored energy started decreasing). The second
conﬁguration would instead allow the node to almost run out of energy while still running the protocol. If the third
conﬁguration was used in a scenario like this, the node would instead join the protocol only when almost fully charged
and therefore be able to sustain a considerable number of executions, but it would not stop right away or exhaust its
energy storage when energy becomes unavailable. Once the main source would reestablish itself, the node would
simply start charging again without having modiﬁed its behavior in the meanwhile.
4.3. Adaptive Sliding Window
Another conﬁguration that we took into consideration has been designed to increase adaptability, thus better suiting
EH-WSNs. Here we use a sliding threshold window that adapts to the current harvesting rate of a sensor. The window
is allowed to shift up and down, and to shrink or expand depending on the current harvesting rate. The idea is to start
in a conﬁguration similar to the ﬁrst scenario presented before with a small window positioned at the top. As we know,
this is a conservative approach and a good starting point for when the node ﬁrst comes online and has not much energy
available. As the harvesting rate and the available energy increase, the window will start moving down and increase
in size, reaching a conﬁguration that is halfway between arrangements number two and three. If the harvesting rate
becomes negative, the window will revert to its previous state by ﬂoating back up and reducing its size.
As shown in Figure 2 the adaptive conﬁguration performs similarly to the second conﬁgurations, however, it will
prevent a node to run too low on energy by increasing the minimum threshold when there is not enough energy.
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Fig. 2: Multipath reinforcement for EH-WSNs. Both thresholds for the participation of a node move according to the amount of energy available,
making a node more likely to participate if it has abundant energy.
Another advantage of this approach is that the nodes that are harvesting more energy will be the ones that will take
part in the protocol more often. Furthermore, this concept remains true in an adaptive way, meaning that if the energy
source will change in such a way that some nodes will not harvest as much energy, but others will start harvesting
more, then the second group will take over the duties of the ﬁrst one.
As with the other scheme, the initial level of the thresholds and the expansion-contraction rate are system parame-
ters that can be tuned according to the application and the energy source in use.
5. Conclusion and Acknowledgement
In this paper we have proposed a new multipath key reinforcement scheme speciﬁcally designed for EH-WSNs.
In this scheme, sustainability can be achieved by balancing the number of reinforcement links used by the two nodes
willing to establish a new key and the availability of reinforcement neighbors. Both parameters can be adaptively
chosen according to the amount of energy available to each node. In particular, we have presented two diﬀerent
approaches, one static (thresholds for the hysteresis cycle statically deﬁned) and one fully dynamic (sliding threshold
window that adapts to the current harvesting rate of a sensor). Experimental results by means of simulations have
shown the validity of the proposed protocol. The research described in this paper has partially been funded by the
IDEA4CPS project.
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